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ROBERT L. MEYERS, III*
DEBRA A. PERELMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Indemnification, an idea originating under common law, al-
lows the burden of loss to be shifted from one party to another.
This concept commonly is incorporated into construction con-
tracts to allow the party to be indemnified (the "indemnitee") to
gain protection against certain risks of loss by allocating those
risks to another party (the "indemnitor"). As a general rule,
these provisions are to be interpreted like any other contractual
provision - by recognizing the intent of the parties entering
into the agreement. The enforceability of various indemnity
agreements, however, frequently has been litigated because the
parties' intent is not always clear.
Indemnity provisions are unenforceable if they are against
public policy. Many jurisdictions have statutorily determined
which types of clauses are void and unenforceable, as against
public policy. Such statutes frequently state that they do not
affect insurance contracts; therefore, the risk of loss arising from
liability on an indemnification obligation may be further allo-
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cated to insurance companies, spreading the risk throughout the
construction industry. This article discusses recent trends in the
enforcement of indemnity provisions and the allocation of risks
therein insured.
II. COMMON LAW INDEMNIFICATION
The general rule of indemnity allows a person chargeable
with the wrongful act of another, who pays damages to the in-
jured party as a result, a right of indemnity from the person who
committed the wrongful act.1 "The underlying principle of in-
demnity rests on the notion that when one is compelled to pay
money another ought to pay, the former may recover the sum so
paid from the latter if the one making the payment is free from
causal negligence."'2 Under common law, therefore, parties seek-
ing indemnification have the burden of proving that they are not
at fault.
3
Absent a showing of freedom from personal fault, a party
cannot be indemnified under common law since common-law in-
demnity is an equitable principle that shifts the entire burden of
loss from one party to another. A "just and equitable result"
can be produced only when the liability for injury is placed on
the person who actively causes the injury, as opposed to the per-
son who is secondarily liable for her own negligence but did not
actually cause the injury.'
III. CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS
In the context of contracts, the concept of indemnity is used
to secure a party from future loss or damages.6 The contract ob-
ligates one person to reimburse the other for any loss, damage,
or liability that the other incurs while acting at the indemnitor's
1. See Peeples v. City of Detroit, 99 Mich. App. 285, 292, 297 N.W.2d 839, 841
(1980); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787 (1975).
2. McLouth Steel Corp. v. A.E. Anderson Constr. Corp., 48 Mich. App. 424, 430,
210 N.W.2d 448, 451 (1973) (emphasis in original).
3. See id.
4. See Peeples, 99 Mich. App. at 292, 297 N.W. at 841; Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987).
5. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St. 2d at 13-14, 321 N.E.2d at
790.
6. See Ordinary v. Connolly, 75 N.J. Eq. 521, 72 A. 363 (1909).
990 [Vol. 40
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request or for his benefit.7 While the indemnitor may not be pri-
marily liable in a culpability sense, he is liable by contract if the
parties have bargained for the terms of indemnity and there is
no disparity in bargaining power or undue influence.8 Further-
more, absence of fault need not be shown."
In the construction industry, indemnity provisions fre-
quently are used to transfer the risk of loss from the owner to
the contractor or from the contractor to a subcontractor. Be-
cause the inherent risks in the construction industry are signifi-
cant, the parties will find it especially important to bargain for
the allocation of risks associated with personal and bodily injury
and property damage, even if such losses occur absent fault on
the part of either, or both, party(ies). Commonly, an employee
on a job site or a third-party passerby is injured as the result of
someone's negligence. A typical example is that of an employee
injured by a falling brick or tool.'0 The following indemnity
clause, also known as a "hold harmless" provision, illustrates the
allocation of risk of loss between the indemnitee and the
contractor:
Contractor covenants and agrees that it shall indemnify and
hold [Indemnitee], and all of its officers, agents and employes
[sic], harmless from any claim, loss, damage, cost, charge or ex-
pense, whether to any person or property or both, arising di-
rectly or indirectly out of Contractor's, or any of its Subcon-
tractor's, performance of the Contract, to which [Indemnitee],
or any of its officers, agents or employes [sic] may be subject or
put by reason of any act, action, neglect or omission on the
part of Contractor, any of its Subcontractors or [Indemnitee],
or any of their respective officers, agents and employes [sic],
7. See Vandiver v. Pollak, 107 Ala. 547, 19 So. 180 (1895); Hall v. Equitable Sur.
Co., 126 Ark. 535, 191 S.W. 32 (1917); Westville Land Co. v. Handle, 112 N.J.L. 447, 171
A. 520 (1934).
8. See Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496, 508, 140 A.2d 403, 409 (Ct. App. Div.
1958) ("[T]here is no reason why the courts should not give [a normal, sensible and
bargained-for business arrangement] the sanction they would accord any other business
contract equally clearly expressed"); Halpern, Indemnity Provisions in Construction
Contracts, 9 CONSTR. L. ADviSOR 1 (Sept. 1988).
9. See Peeples v. City of Detroit, 99 Mich. App. 285, 293, 297 N.W. 839, 842-43
(1980).
10. See generally W. DERK, INSURANCE FOR CONTRACTORS (5th rev. ed. 1981) (dis-
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except that neither Contractor nor any of its Subcontractors
shall be liable under this section for damages arising out of in-
jury or damage to persons or property directly caused by or
resulting from the sole negligence of [Indemnitee], or any of its
officers, agents or employes [sic] .... 11
This provision indemnifies the indemnitee for his own negli-
gence so long as the indemnitor is concurrently negligent. Under
this clause, however, the indemnitee may not be indemnified for
losses sustained as a result of his sole negligence. Generally, ab-
sent a state statute to the contrary, the parties may bargain for
a "hold harmless" agreement that indemnifies the indemnitee
for varying degrees of liability (including his own sole negli-
gence, the concurrent negligence of the parties, sole negligence
of the indemnitor, and strict liability).12 If the parties' intent is
clear,13 these provisions will be upheld so long as the court finds
no breach of duty to the public.14
The parties also may negotiate the types of losses, damages,
and liabilities that may be indemnified.15 These include not only
bodily injury, death, and property damage but also breach of
warranty, breach of contract, antitrust violations, patent, trade-
mark or copyright infringements, willful misconduct, and crimi-
11. See Giguere v. Detroit Edison Co., 114 Mich. App. 452, 456-57, 319 N.W.2d
334, 336 (1982) (emphasis added). The Michigan Court of Appeals held this clause en-
forceable to the extent that the parties were concurrently negligent. The court found this
to be a "clear expression of an intent to indemnify," id. at 458, 319 N.W.2d at 337;
therefore, this particular provision must have met the "clear and unequivocal" test re-
quired in a majority of jurisdictions, including Michigan. See infra notes 22-27 and ac-
companying text.
12. See Stern, 49 N.J. Super. at 507, 140 A.2d 409 (parties' intent would be frus-
trated if the obligation to indemnify was qualified by the kind or degree of fault or negli-
gence causing the loss, damage, or liability).
13. Many jurisdictions have determined what degree of clarity is necessary to en-
force an indemnity provision that indemnifies for the indemnitee's own negligence. See
infra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
14. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 95 Colo. 99, 33 P.2d 974
(1934). The majority of states have enacted legislation that provides the degree of liabil-
ity which, when agreed to be indemnified for, makes the indemnification provision void
and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. See also infra notes 18-21 and accompa-
nying text.
15. See, e.g., All-State Investigation & Sec. Agency, Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 301
A.2d 273, 275 (Del. 1972) (provision specifically including indemnification for claims
based on patent, copyright, or trademark infringement and claims brought under the
Workmen's Compensation Act); Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 707
(Tex. 1987) (general clause indemnifying for loss or damage to persons or property).
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nal behavior. The indemnitor may be subject to damages deter-
mined by judgment, by terms of the contract, or by settlement
of the parties.
IV. RECENT LIMITATIONS IN INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS
The American Institute of Architects (AIA) and National
Society of Engineers (NSPE) included an indemnity provision in
their 1966 standard construction contract forms that held the
architects and engineers harmless from liability caused by the
general contractor or its agents. 6 In response, and as a result of
general contractors' inability to successfully negotiate the elimi-
nation of such provisions from their contracts, general contrac-
tors lobbied state legislatures to change the provisions' legal
effect.
1 7
South Carolina, like the majority of states, has enacted a
statute that limits the scope of enforceable indemnification pro-
visions."i Many states, including South Carolina, limit enforcea-
ble indemnification to those situations in which the indemnitee
is held harmless for the negligence of the indemnitor or the con-
current negligence of the parties, but do not allow indemnifica-
tion for the sole negligence of the indemnitee. 9 Some states
completely prohibit indemnification for negligence of any
party.20 Other states prohibit indemnification for negligence,
whether sole or concurrent, of the indemnitee.2' The effect of
16. See Halpern, supra note 8, at 4.
17. See id.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-2-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
19. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.900 (1986); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-226
(Supp. 1988); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782 (West 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431.453 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 29-114 (1980); IND. CODE § 26-2-5-1 (Supp. 1988); MD. CTS. & JUD. PnOC.
CODE ANN. § 5-305 (1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 691.991 (West 1987); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:40A-1 (1987); OR REV. STAT. § 30.140 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-2-10 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 56-3-18 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-6-123
(1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-1 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.1 (1985); WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.115 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-14 (1981).
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2704 (1975) (This statute applies only to
negligence in the planning stages and not in construction. See All-State Investigation &
Sec. Agency v. Turner Constr. Co., 301 A.2d 273 (Del. 1972)); FLA. STAT. § 725.06 (1988)
(prohibiting indemnification agreements unless they contain a monetary limitation and
the agreement is part of a bid, or consideration is given); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29, para. 61,
§ 1 (Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338-A:1 (1984).
21. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 29C (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 337.02 (West 1988);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,187 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-1 (Replacement Pamphlet
1989] 993
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the latter is to allow indemnification, in cases of negligence, only
for losses incurred as a result of the negligence of the indemni-
tor, thus codifying the original policy created under common
law.
In most jurisdictions, whether limited by statute or not,
"the law frowns upon contracts intended to exculpate a party
from the consequences of his own negligence and though, with
certain exceptions, they are enforceable, such agreements are
subject to close judicial scrutiny. 2 2 This "rule of strict construc-
tion" has been implemented in many jurisdictions. At least
twenty-four states have done so under some form of the "clear
and unequivocal" test.2 3 This test provide that in order to be
enforceable, the parties' intent to impose an obligation upon the
indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee against his own negli-
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-1 (Supp. 1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.31 (Anderson
1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-34-1 (1985); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 130.002
(Vernon Supp. 1989) (prohibiting indemnification for negligence of an architect or
engineer).
22. See, e.g., Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. v. Tri-Delta Constr. Corp., 107
A.D.2d 450, 451, 487 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430, (quoting Grose v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 106, 400
N.E.2d 306, 308, 424 N.Y.S. 365, 367 (1979)), afl'd, 65 N.Y.2d 1038, 484 N.E.2d 1047, 494
N.Y.S.2d 695 (1985). See also Sink & Edwards, Inc. v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., 458
N.E.2d 291, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that provisions requiring indemnification
for indemnitee's own negligence are not enforceable unless expressed in clear and une-
quivocal terms).
23. See, e.g., Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Jansen, 203 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1953)
(applying Nebraska law); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mason & Dulion Co., 274
Ala. 202, 145 So. 2d 711 (1962); Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian Constr. Co., 152 Ariz.
455, 733 P.2d 652 (1986); Pickens-Bond Constr. Co. v. North Little Rock Elec. Co., 249
Ark. 389, 459 S.W.2d 549, appeal after remand, 253 Ark. 172, 495 S.W.2d 197 (1972);
Laudano v. General Motors Corp., 34 Conn. Supp. 684, 388 A.2d 842 (Super. Ct. 1977);
Cumberbatch v. Board of Trustees, 382 A.2d 1383 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Cone Bros.
Contracting Co. v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 458 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), peti-
tion for review denied, 464 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1985); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. C.R.A.
Transp. Co., 167 Ga. App. 16, 306 S.E.2d 27 (1983); Maxon Corp. v. Tyler Pipe Indus.,
Inc., 497 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Wallace v. Slidell Memorial Hosp., 509 So. 2d
69 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Parliament Constr. Co. v. Beer Precast Concrete Ltd., 114 Mich.
App. 607, 319 N.W.2d 374 (1982); Braegelman v. Horizon Dev. Co., 371 N.W.2d 644
(Minn. Ct. App. 1982); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 536 S.W.2d
881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Port Auth. v. Honeywell Protective Servs., 222 N.J. Super. 11,
535 A.2d 974 (Ct. App. Div. 1987); Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. v. Tri-Delta Constr.
Corp., 107 A.D.2d 450, 487 N.Y.S.2d 428, aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 1038, 484 N.E.2d 1047, 494
N.Y.S.2d 695 (1985); Kay v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 Ohio St. 503, 103 N.E.2d 751 (1952);
Broce Constr. Co. v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1970); Barrus v. Wil-
kinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 207 (1965); Northwest Airlines v. Hughes Air Corp.,
104 Wash. 2d 152, 702 P.2d 1192 (1985); Herchelroth v. Mahar, 36 Wis. 2d 140, 153
N.W,2d 6 (1967).
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gence must be expressed in "clear and unequivocal" terms.24
The "clear and unequivocal" test is not applied uniformly,
however. In some states, extrinsic evidence is allowed to prove
the intent of the parties.2 5 In others, intent may be shown by the
language of the construction contract.26 Occasionally, courts al-
low parties to offer terms of another document incorporated in
the contract by reference.
In Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co.28 the Texas Su-
preme Court abandoned the "clear and unequivocal" test and
adopted the "express negligence" rule. The court held that
"[the express negligence doctrine provides that parties seeking
to indemnify the indemnitee from the consequences of its own
negligence must express that intent in specific terms. . . within
the four corners of the contract. '29 The critical element under
this "express negligence" rule is that the intended obligation be
stated "in so many words."3 The court in Ethyl Corp. explained
that the adoption of the express negligence rule was the result of
a trend toward more strict construction of indemnity contracts
and a reaction to contract writers' propensity to write vague pro-
visions that fail to state the true intent of those provisions. "The
intent of the scriveners is to indemnify the indemnitee for its
negligence, yet be just ambiguous enough to conceal that intent
from the indemnitor."31
While there may be some basis for the court's perception,
the situation would not appear to be any more true in the area
of indemnification than in any other area of contractual agree-
ment. Moreover, the effect of the express negligence rule poten-
tially may invalidate the risk allocation under documents having
24. See, e.g., All-State Investigation & Sec. Agency v. Turner Constr. Co., 301 A.2d
273, 275 (Del. 1972); Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J. Super. 496, 502, 140 A.2d 403, 406 (Ct.
App. Div. 1958).
25. See, e.g., Amendola v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (applying
New York, federal common, and admiralty law); Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec.
Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 272, 84 P.2d 313, 320 (1938).
26. See, e.g., Laudano v. General Motors Corp., 34 Conn. Supp. 684, 388 A.2d 842
(Super. Ct. 1977).
27. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mason & Dulion Co., 274 Ala.
202, 207-08, 145 So. 2d 711, 714-15 (1962).
28. 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 707-08.
1989]
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industry-wide use and acceptance. In fact, there has been only
one Texas case in which the indemnity provision was upheld as
meeting this stringent test. 2
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the need for rules of strict
construction,33 some courts apparently are still willing to impose
strict liability upon an indemnitor based upon broadly worded
indemnification provisions.3 4 In Louisiana, where contracts in-
demnifying one against the consequences of his own negligence
are strictly construed, the supreme court in Sovereign Insurance
Co. v. Texas Pipe Line Co.35 determined that a provision that is
doubtful or fails to address the issue of indemnification against
strict liability may be further interpreted "in light of everything
that, by law, custom, usages or equity is considered as incidental
or necessary to its effectuation."3 " Such an interpretation is not
allowed for indemnification provisions that are ambiguous with
respect to their coverage of acts of negligence. It is unclear
whether acts of negligence were contemplated by the parties
since the obligor lacks the "ability to evaluate, predict, or con-
32. See BFW Constr. Co. v. Garza, 748 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1988). The indemnity
provision that met the requirements of express negligence is as follows:
(a) Subcontractor shall fully protect, indemnify and defend Contractor
and hold it harmless from and against any and all claims, demands, liens, dam-
ages, causes of action and liabilities of any and every nature whatsoever arising
in any manner, directly or indirectly, out of or in connection with or in the
course of or incidental to any of Subcontractor's work or operations hereunder
or in connection herewith (regardless of cause or of any concurrent or contrib-
uting fault or negligence of Contractor) or any breach of or failure to comply
with any of the provisions of this Subcontract or the Contract Document by
Subcontractor.
(b) Subcontractor shall fully protect, indemnify and defend Contractor
and hold it harmless from and against any and all claims, demands, causes of
action, damages and liabilities for injury to or death of Subcontractor or any
one or more of subcontractor's employees or agents, or any subcontractor or
supplier of subcontractor, or any employee or agent of any such subcontractor
or supplier, arising in any manner, directly or indirectly, out of or in connec-
tion with or in the course of or incidental to any work or operation or opera-
tions of Subcontractor or Contractor or any other contractor or subcontractor
or party, or otherwise in the course and scope of their employment, and re-
gardless of cause or of any fault or negligence of Contractor.
Id. at 612.
33. See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Patton v. T.O.F.C., Inc., 79 Ill. App. 3d 94, 398 N.E.2d 313 (1979);
Sovereign Ins. Co. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 488 So. 2d 982 (La. 1986); Berry v. V. Ponte &
Sons, 166 N.J. Super. 513, 400 A.2d 114 (Ct. App. Div. 1979).
35. 488 So. 2d 982 (La. 1986).
36. Id. at 983.
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trol the risk which may be created by the indemnitee's future
conduct. '3 7 On the other hand, the indemnification against strict
liability imposed for injury caused by inherently dangerous
materials is more clearly bargained 'for.38 The court reasoned
that indemnity for liability arising from negligence provides a
disincentive to careful and prudent conduct, while indemnity for
strict liability would not.3 The Indiana court of appeals in Pat-
ton v. T.O.F.C., Inc.,40 however, upheld a contract allowing in-
demnification for strict liability, based upon a finding of "clear
intent" of the parties to do so.41
Few jurisdictions thus far have faced the indemnity obliga-
tion issue; therefore, it is difficult to predict whether a trend will
develop allowing indemnification provisions to be more liberally
construed regarding strict liability for inherently dangerous
products.
V. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY
Many states have passed limiting legislation regarding in-
demnity provisions in construction contracts that indemnify for
negligence. 42 Some of these states, however, have expressly pro-
vided that the statutory provision is not to affect the purchase of
insurance.43 Through the purchase of insurance, the indemnitor
can insure the risk of loss from his indemnity obligation. As
such, one might think that an indemnitor would not hesitate to
enter into an indemnity agreement in order to obtain a construc-
tion contract. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the result -
not only because of the limitations placed upon the coverage al-
lowed by the insurance industry, but also because the indemni-
tor needs to protect his claim experience record in order to re-
37. Id. at 986.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. 79 Ill. App. 3d 94, 398 N.E.2d 313 (1979).
41. See id. at 99, 398 N.E.2d at 317.
42. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.900 (1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782 (West 1986);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2704 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-453 (1985); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-305 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 337.03 (West Supp. 1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-21, 187 (1985); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:40A-1 (1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.31 (Anderson 1981); OIL RE V. STAT. § 30.140 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.1
(1985); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-14 (1981).
1989]
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main insurable." Indemnified losses will be charged against the
experience record of the insured, regardless of whether he is di-
rectly liable or merely liable under the indemnity agreement.
Because insurance is often a critical element in obtaining con-
struction contracts, contractors and subcontractors need to pro-
tect their experience records so that insurance companies will
continue coverage; therefore, these contractors and subcontrac-
tors may be reluctant to assume the liabilities of another, even if
the risk of those losses may be insured.
Commercial General Liability (CGL)45 policies provide cov-
erage for "those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property dam-
age' to which this insurance applies. '46 It does not, however,
"apply to . . . '[b]odily injury' or 'property damage' for which
the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the as-
sumption of liability in a contract or agreement. . . [unless] as-
sumed in a contract or agreement that is an 'insured contract;'
or . . . [t]hat the insured would have in the absence of the con-
tract or agreement. 47 An "insured contract" is defined by the
CGL policy as:
a. A lease of premises;
b. A sidetrack agreement;
c. An easement or license agreement in connection with vehicle
or pedestrian private railroad crossings at grade;
d. Any other easement agreement, except in connection with
construction or demolition operations on or within 50 feet of
railroad;
e. An indemnification of a municipality as required by ordi-
nance, except in connection with work for a municipality;
f. An elevator maintenance agreement;
g. That part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to
your business under which you assume the tort liability of an-
other to pay damages because of "bodily injury" or "property
damage" to a third person or organization, if the contract or
44. See generally W. DERK, supra note 10, at 6-53 (discussing identification and
analysis of risks as well as alternatives avoidable to address and minimize these risks).
45. These policies formerly were called "Comprehensive General Liability" policies.
46. See, e.g., Wulfsberg & Colvig, The 1986 Commercial General Liability Insur-
ance Program, in CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND LITIGATION 1988, 308 P.L.I. 397, app.
435 (1988).
47. Id. at app. 436.
[Vol. 40
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agreement is made prior to the "bodily injury" or "property
damage." Tort liability means a liability that would be im-
posed by law in the absence of any contract or agreemdnt. 48
Under the prior standard CGL policy, subsection "g" was
not included and indemnity provisions only could be insured to
the extent that the indemnitor-insured would incur liability in
the absence of the indemnity provision, such as common law tort
liability. While the indemnity provision held the indemnitor lia-
ble for losses incurred by the indemnitee, the insured indemni-
tor could not insure the risk of loss arising if the indemnity pro-
vision allowed the indemnitee to be held harmless for bodily
injury or property damage incurred as a result of the indemni-
tee's own sole negligence. 49 Therefore, while clauses for indemni-
fication obligations for negligence of the indemnitee are becom-
ing more difficult to enforce due to state courts and legislatures,
by adding subsection "g," the insurance industry has made such
clauses easier to insure.
Formerly, to cover its indemnification obligations, the in-
demnitor needed to purchase contractual liability insurance,50
which applies to liability assumed by the insured under contract.
Now, to the extent that the insured wants additional coverage
for indemnified risks not covered under subsection "g" - those
risks that do not arise as a result of a party's tort liability - the
insured still will need to consider contractual liability coverage.
This coverage is available in two basic forms: standard contrac-
tual coverage and blanket contractual coverage. Standard con-
tractual coverage may be written as a separate coverage or
added to the standard CGL in the form of an endorsement. 1
Under the standard contractual coverage policy, the contracts
under which liability has been assumed must be listed in the
48. Id. at 470. The policy, under its definition of "insured contract," expressly ex-
cludes contracts that (1) indemnify architects, engineers, and surveyors for injury or
damage arising out of specific acts and (2) contracts under which the indemnitor-insured
is an engineer, architect, or surveyor assuming liability for those specific injuries or dam-
ages, as well as others. See id. at 471.
49. See Contractual Risk Transfer, in CONSTRUCTION RISK MANAGEMENT X.F.1 (In-
ternational Risk Management Institute, Inc. 1st reprint 1986).
50. Id.
51. See id. at X.F.2. This coverage provides for payment of "all sums which the
insured, by reason of contractual liability assumed by him under a contract designated in
the schedule for this insurance, shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies." Id.
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insurance schedule in order to be insured. Therefore, the indem-
nitor should carefully list such contracts because he will not be
covered for liability assumed under a hold harmless agreement
in a contract that is omitted from the insurance schedule.
, The advantage of blanket contractual coverage is that no
schedule of covered contracts is submitted. Instead, all contracts
are covered, thus eliminating the risk of omitting a contract and
losing its coverage. The disadvantage of blanket coverage is that,
as an endorsement to the main CGL policy, it is subject to the
same dollar limits as the CGL policy.2 To compensate for this,
the indemnitor may purchase "umbrella" coverage, which pro-
vides "excess limits for the same hazards insured under primary
policies, subject to a high limit per occurrence and in the
aggregate.
'53
Contractual liability coverage is subject to the same exclu-
sions as the main CGL policy, as well as its own set of exclu-
sions.54 The first of these exclusions from contractual liability
coverage disallows coverage if the indemnitor-insured is an ar-
chitect, engineer, or surveyor and if the bodily injury or property
damage arises out of its design or supervisory activities. These
risks are covered by the architect's professional liability insur-
ance, as opposed to the contractor's liability coverages. 5 5 The
second exclusion provides that the insurance does not apply to
liability of the indemnitee, if the indemnitee is an architect, en-
gineer or surveyor, arising out of:
a. the preparation or approval of or the fialure to prepare or
approve maps, drawings, opinions, reports, surveys, change or-
ders, design, or specifications; or
b. the giving of or the failure to give directions or instructions
by the indemnitee, his agent or employees, provided such giv-
ing or failure to give is the primary cause of the bodily injury
or property damage . . ..
This second exclusion, however, would not force the risk to be
allocated to the indemnitee's industry, such as architecture, en-
gineering, or surveying. The indemnitor under an enforceable in-
52. See id. at X.F.2-3.
53. W. DERK, supra note 10, at 76.
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demnity provision would bear the risk of this uninsured loss.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent trends in allocating risks in the construction in-
dustry have afforded contractors and subcontractors a great deal
of protection. By statute, individual states are making it more
difficult to uphold indemnity provisions for the negligence of the
indemnitee, especially if the damage was incurred as the result
of the indemnitee's sole negligence. This affords protection to
contractors and subcontractors, who frequently are indemnitors
with lesser bargaining power than the indemnitee. The courts
also have recognized this disparity in bargaining power and will
not enforce such indemnity provisions without a "clear and une-
quivocal" showing of the parties' intent to do so. Finally, if a
party must agree to indemnify for another's negligence, those in-
demnified risks are likely to be insurable. Under the standard
policies, the insurance industry will not insure indemnified risks
assumed by architects, engineers, or surveyors, since those risks
should be allocated to their respective industries through their
own insurers. Provisions indemnifying architects, engineers, and
surveyors, however, also are not insurable under many standard
policies, so contractors who agree to these indemnity provisions
for activities in the early stages of construction are not protected
by insurance and must be careful in contracting to be sure cer-
tain risks are properly alcoated or bargained for in the contract.
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